tv Ivo Daalder on the Future of NATO CSPAN November 18, 2013 12:20am-1:21am EST
for short-term visitors from oman, qatar and united arab emirates making it easier for companies to come here and do business. this will be up and running in the new year and we will roll it out to kuwait later next year. and we're doing something else to drive up that inward investment. i am delighted that alderman and former lord mayor sir michael bear has agreed to chair a new regeneration investment organisation as part of uk trade and investment. this will act as a one-stop shop for our major inward investment opportunities with £100 billion of possible projects on the table. these projects won't just mean new jobs in london or the south east - but right across the whole country. and the first deal is just days away to boost regeneration in places like liverpool, salford, sheffield and leeds. a state we can afford. an economy where everyone can take part. an economy equipped for the
future. and an economy based on enterprise at home and abroad. that's how we build something better. that's how we can build an economy for everyone. and by doing this, we needn't look at the global race with fear. but with confidence. confident in the belief that britain can come through stronger. confident that with the right decisions now our children can look forward to a better future. confident that here in the city of london - the great innovator that has led the way in finance for centuries we can support a great britain whose innovation and creativity can lead the world for generations to come. thank you. [applause]
>> you can watch british prime minister david cameron live on wednesday when he addresses members of the house of commons during question time. span two.rns live on c- chance tolso a second watch it when it airs hyundai on sees. -- sunday on c-span. >> there are some serious scholars in women's studies. offerics to straightforward courses in women's psychology, women's history, women's and literature. ideologically fervent hard- liners in some departments. if a department defies the stereotype, let me know, i want to visit them. women, modern women, traditionally religious women, they are left out.
late 20thtiques of century feminism have led critics to label her as anti- feminist. your questions for author chri stina hoff sommers. joint radio talk show host mark levin on c-span2. up next, a discussion of nato's priorities and challenges. that is followed by a senate homeland security meeting. both chambers of congress will gavel back into session on monday. the house returns at noon eased
her for general speeches. will be held after 6:30 p.m. eastern time. p.m. onte returns at 2 a bill to improve oversight. u.s.he nomination of a circuit court judge. senators may vote to he can work on an authorization bill for defense programs. you can watch live coverage on c-span. the senate is on c-span two. here's is some insight from a capitol hill reporter. phone, he will tell us what is ahead for congress this week. an updateso give us on possible congressional action regarding iran. hi and thank you for joining us.
monday.e returns on tuesday they are scheduled to begin debate on energy security. can you tell us about the details? >> it looks like the house is look at a number of members -- measures that would expand access to domestic energy production. and the movement of domestic energy, there is a national -- natural gas movement. it may require the national regulatory institutions issued permits. -- it may essentially block the federal government from regulating hydraulic fracking and turn cases and they where existing permitting regimes and oversight are the excess.
>> has the house democratic leadership announced their support for any of these bills? >> i have not heard yet what the house leadership is planning to do. i would say that the house republicans have said that they are planning to set rules for floor debate on all of these measures. in essence, you might expect there to be some sort of partisan opposition on energy matters. eachare difficult in chamber because there are some democrats who have regional differences that emerge. some of them a side of the republicans. >> in the senate, they have a series of procedural votes on monday afternoon involving a u.s. circuit court nomination and a bill on compounding pharmacies. can you tell us more about that? >> the judicial nomination vote coree last of the three
votes that they have lined up in an attempt to break filibusters to sit on the circuit court of appeals in the district of columbia. that is viewed as the second highest court in the land. the republicans have opposed the previous nominees, making a series of arguments. the democrats think that this is just an effort by republicans to try and keep a balance of the court tilts been a way that is favorable to republicans, despite there being a democratic president. the compounding pharmacy go has been lingering on the senate floor for a while. it is an agreement designed to increase fda oversight and regulatory authority. that bill is just running through all of the procedural articles. there is no real substantive objection to it.
there is a dispute with david vitter over an amendment that is not related to that bill. >> on monday, work is expected to begin on the defense authorization. could you discuss the amendments they plan to debate? >> the defense bill is interesting because it is in line with whenever the debate lines -- ends on that compound pharmacy bill, there'll be no shortage of hot button debates. the one that is the most closely related to the bill is a method in which sexual assault cases are prosecuted and investigated within the military. there's really a disagreement between two camps, one that has been led by senator jill brands of new york. the other one has been read by -- led by senator claire mccaskill of missouri. it is over whether the chain of
command should be removed from consideration in terms of how these cases and other military justice matters are handled. the military brass often opposes the idea of undercutting or changing the protocol regarding the chain of command. >> is there a timeline yet for the defense authorization bill? >> between the sexual assault issue and what is going on with the other issue that may come up, including the oversight of the intelligence program and this issue with potentially lifting sanctions against iran, it is not clear yet. these amendments often take time to process. we have not even talked about any of the normal disagreements about combat systems and ships and readiness an actual nuts and bolts military issues.
the idea would be that the bill is on the senate floor before thanksgiving, in time for the thanksgiving break. that is becoming increasingly unlikely. there are a number of issues that seem to be piling up. -- secretary of state senator kerry was on capitol hill. do they plan to move forward with new sanctions against iran or not? >> senator carl levin who is the chairman of the armed services committee has been saying in recent days that he is hoping that the banking committee, which has jurisdiction over this matter primarily, will move forward with marking out a new round of sanctions against iran. this could occur as early as next week. he has been asking for that in a bid to keep the debate off of
the defense bill. as of this moment, nothing has been scheduled. -- thes of a new route white house and secretary kerry and others do not want to see this happen at this point in time given the ongoing country ofs with the iran and other countries involved. they do not want to see anything that could upset the balance in the talks. there are quite a few more hawkish senators who are pushing for that action. >> thank you very much. the cq roll call congressional reporter. with what is coming up in congress next week. >> thank you. >> if you are a middle or high school student, c-span wants to
know what is the most important issue congress should address next year? make a 5-7 minute video and includes c-span programming for your chance to win a grand prize of $5,000. the deadline is junior he 20th. get more info on student cam.org. >> the former u.s. ambassador to nato discusses nato's priorities and challenges as part of an event hosted by the atlantic council. ino members are meeting britain for their annual summit. >> good afternoon everyone. i would like to welcome you back to our conference. i'm new executive vice president here at the atlantic council. we are delighted to welcome speech a man on with his
on austerity. this will be a first beach on nato since he stepped down as the u.s. permanent representative to the atlantic council last summer. he is giving the speech now as the new board director here at the atlantic council. he has always been known for being thoughtful and frank. we have the opportunity to hear from the ambassador. after four years of serving as ambassador to nato, we have an opportunity today to hear about what he learned during his time at the alliance and lessons for nato's future as it looks not only to a summit next year, but an alliance post-2014 in afghanistan. nato permanente representative to united states for four years. until july 2013. it was a tumultuous time and a
significant time. he was an intellectual driver behind a new strategic concept to devise the role of the alliance. discuss operations, but delves into sensitive political issues. the leading voice on issues of arms control and disarmament. fingerprintsld use -- could see his fingerprints on nato reviews and president obama's agenda. he drove a surge among the allies in afghanistan. he championed a new model for alliance intervention in the operation in libya. onlys also been one of the u.s. ambassadors, the few u.s. ambassadors, to serve as a permanent host to eat the nato alliance. when they hosted the alliance for summit in chicago.
it was in the run-up to chicago that both he and his family film of the windy city. that is now his permanent home. he is coming to us today from chicago. he is now leading charters to help chicago on the map. an just becoming international economic city, but also with security. netherlands, he is the transatlantic link that we are so proud of here. he has written the book on transatlantic security and national security. with landmark books on coast of oh and national security council. before heading out to nato, he was the dean of the university of maryland. he served on the national security council's top during the clinton in administration. theme welcome him to podium. we're looking forward to your reflections today. [applause]
>> thank you for that kind introduction. it is good to be here. i heard you say that you were hoping for a provocative and frank's reach. because this is off the record, right? except for c-span. it is really fitting to have the opportunity to talk about my four years at nato and what the future looks like here at the atlantic council. we have done so much to support transatlantic relations and nato. and to support my own work when i was in brussels. theuding, in the run-up to nato summit in chicago. when the atlantic council worked very closely, hand-in-hand, with the chicago council on global
affairs to bring nato to the united states. and to remind people how poor in this alliance really is. that is what i want to talk about. next year is the 65th anniversary of nato. in most countries, not all, but most in europe, that means you retire. , is it timestion is for nato to retire? may answer is, i surely hope not. for one, i think it is healthy to continue working after 65. more importantly, is the fact that we've united states need nato and i would argue that we the united states need nato more than ever. not whetherstion is nato needs to retire. the real question is whether nato will still be there for us when we need it. that is what i want to talk about.
if there is a challenge. -- i hopequestion nato can adapt to new challenges. that is what has made a great alliance. will he continued to do that adaptation in the future? in the 65 years of this alliance, nato has evolved. to use the software metaphor was once the cold war alliance. it was there to protect europe so that it could rebuild after a devastating two decades of war. europe was rebuilt and became prosperous and the cold war itself was one without even firing a shot. the european union, european
prosperity, it was made possible by the fact that united dates was committed to defense through the organization of nato. it was at one point a extraordinary success of transatlantic leadership. to american commitment defense and security. after the first four years, what is nato going to do? it turns out nato did have a role. nato 2.0 did have a whirl. it was part of the postwar alliance. it did in eastern europe what the alliance had done in the previous 40 years for western europe. a large part of the alliance and its membership, hand-in-hand with the european union, help solve disputes within and among the countries of central and eastern europe. it helped promote democracy and buildcontrol and it helps
the basis for prosperity in central and eastern europe. that was an extraordinary success of leadership by the transatlantic alliance. and when i came to nato in 2009, the real question was, now that we have succeeded in winning the cold war, and now that we have succeeded in making the post- cold war europe as stable and as we had beene able to do for western europe, what was nato's supposed to do? nato had to be updated again. i would argue that we created successfully what i would call an 803.0. we had leadership from a group of experts. i would summarize it as before see's.
4c's. cooperative security by having common structures are on a foundation of common knowledge. collective defense remains the core of what the alliance is about. easily talked about how you maintain collective defense in the new age. whether our threats are cyber terrorism, missiles, or the proliferation of wmds will stop that is not the only thing that nato does. nato is not only concerned about collective defense. it is concerned about things are relevant for the future. we have a commitment to cooperative security. cooperative security that relies not only on what the 28 members of nato can do, but also on white nato can do with its partners around the world. -- is not only concerned about terms of
defense, and arms control. that is as essential for the success of nato, at least as essential, as the commitment to collective defense. what makes nato unique and what we have seen over and over again , and what we've really seen the last two years, is that having common structures, common capabilities is what makes nato more than just a collection of states. a coalition of the willing. it makes us an actor that is larger and more important and better then the component parts. what makes nato unique is that alliance a single set of countries that share a commitment to common values. the values of democracy, human rights, rule of law. 's make nato a new
alliance, one that can endure in the current strategic situation. what also did is that it allowed nato to come for the first time an operational organization. in the last few years, nato became an alliance of operations. involved ino was six operations on three continents with more than 150,000 men and women under nato control. they had a counterterrorism operation in the mediterranean. we have a significant deployment of troops in the balkans. that includes not only nato countries, but also partners from his close by switzerland and austria as far way as morocco. not many people know that there are 200 morocco troops serving under nato command includes -- in kosovo.
we have operation ocean shield, which had links not only to the european union, but also to countries like china, indonesia, and russia. we have an operation in the balkans, as well as over iceland. future, we will have participation from non-nato members in finland and sweden. minutes onnt two those operations and what lessons we learned for nato. , trulystan is a unique unique operation. it involves 50 nations. 150,000 troops. -- 1/3 of which came
from nato members. that wasin afghanistan a mess. it was a place where our mission difficult and we had a strategy that was unfocused. we had a probability of success. that was the situation as we found that in 2009. we adopted a new strategy. when i say we, i mean not only the united egg, but we the alliance. and its many partners. we adopted a new strategy. we narrowed commission up to this point. the mission was to make afghanistan the next jeffersonian democracy. we wanted them to have the same rights that women have in the nordic countries. it was a large and frankly
unattainable mission. what we did is we made the focus of the mission real. that was to make sure that have afghanistan -- would never again become a safe haven for terrorists. that is the reason why we were there. we also adapted our means to that mission. time for were to buy the afghan national security forces to be able to take care of security in its own country. by surging troops, not only americans, but allied troops in large numbers. we had a clear deadline. a deadline at the end of december 2014, at which point afghanistan postures wants the hands oflie in the afghan security forces. you can debate whether we are succeeding in that strategy.
i am happy to do so in the q&a. i would argue that the situation today in terms of what has happened enough honest on -- afghanistan has provided security throughout afghanistan. it is a lot better then it would have been if we had continued a strategy of 2009. clearly afghanistan is not a nirvana. there are huge problems remaining in the country. it remains natural. of people in the livelihood the people are better off and more secure than they would have been otherwise. operationthe sixth and a new challenge and a real 3.0 strategicnato concept. natoarted out saying that was a source of predictability in an unpredictable world. when leaders signed off on that
statement, not a single one of them realized three-month later that we would in fact engaged in . military operation in libya it took three years for nato to decide to get involved in bosnia . it took one year for nato to get involved in kosovo. it took one week for nato to decide to get involved in libya. this was a unique mission. it was a mission that involved for the first time real and involvement. people then calling for that for the last 65 years. he allies in the partners provided the bulk of the forces. the united states contributed -- it enabled this operation to succeed. 75%united states provided of the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.
they provided refueling that made the bombing campaign necessary. they provided predators that could go after specific targets. 100% of thed capacity to surprise air defenses. -- suppress error defenses. 13 countries participated in the operation. the vast bulk of those who didn't participate couldn't because they did not have the capabilities. advancednot have the air forces that were necessary for combat organizations. to kosovo when the united states struck 90% of the targets, in libya, the united states struck 10% of the target. that is the kind of mission sharing from a u.s. perspective that we would like to see.
france took the lead and provided a bombing in striking missions in 40% of the cases. countries like denmark, norway, belgium contributed too. those three countries alone provided half the number of aircraft. italy provided bases that raptly crucial to conducting operations and participating in the bombing operation as well. other countries participated and this was in my view, the kind of operation that nato was suited for and is suited for. nato demonstrated that it could still participate in the world today. the bad news is that in five years from now, it is clear that nato could in fact do this operation again. i say this noting that the libby operation was relatively small compared to the kind of bombing
operations we have done in the past. 6 the size of the coast air campaign.o where weok at syria, were contemplating the possible use of force, it was clear that have become two strikes, they would have been overwhelmingly american. not only because some countries did not want to participate, but also because in order to conduct an air campaign against a country with an air defense system like syria's, only the united states had the capability to deal with that kind of threat. with, it seems to me, and here i come to look at where we are in the future, with a european capacity that is real and declining.
it is not where it needs to the 49 a to have a partner that wants to have. the consequences of decisions that were made in the past are coming home to roost. first we're seeing that the effects have significantly affected the investments that we are able to make in the future. rather than increased defense spending in order to allow troops and airplanes and ships abroad in operations, the european government is spending the euros and other currencies away from the investment accounts. they are making sure that they can meet the needs that are there. term, that means that operations were able to be conducted. in long-term, investment has suffered. acondly, we have seen
continuing lack of defense resources. have an nato members significant difference in their defense budgets that translate into real capability problems down the road. ofestment is less than 20% non-u.s. nato european countries , versus 30% for the united eight. the united states today spends three times as much on equipment, and four times as much per soldier on defense compared to its nato allies. thirdly, a decade of dispense spending. -- defense spending. 4 financial -- before the financial crisis, nato spent
1.5%. nato spends 1.3% of its gdp on defense. 3 cut in relative terms since 2000. you cannot have a strong military when you are underinvested in the future. today, only three allies meet the two percent goal aside from the united states. and grace --ngdom , which uses most of its defense money for job creation.
clearly it is something that needs to be recognized. overall, our european allies are not spending enough on defense. the consequences are real. our biggest allies are the ones are likely to face problems at are the worst down the line. in united kingdom, we have seen aggressive cuts in military funding. britain may have only 19 surface vessels and its royal navy. that effectively means that we are having a 25% cut in capability over the next decade. resourcing is not being cut as dramatically as it is in the u.k..
but it is being cut by having spending links to zero percent growth. that will result in a cut to capability. we concede and operations. will france was able to deploy forces, it could only be sustained by having a significant contribution by the united states and many key allies to ensure that a relatively small operation like that could succeed. defenseny, we see a budget stuck at 1.4% of the gdp. restructuring its forces is also affecting its into real translate defense spending. for the first time since world war ii, asia spent more defense in europe. that is a pivot of a kind and i'm not sure europeans want to see. covershe united states
75% of the overall spending in nato. the u.s. is cutting its defense spending, but it is willing to -- itsze the allies willingness to subsidize the allies will decline. this as the case in mali where the u.s. provided assistance but wanted to get paid for. these trends are unsustainable. it is not just me who is saying that. it is what the secretary said when he left in june 2011. it is another secretary said when he left in october 2012. it is with hillary clinton said -- said last year at the awards dinner. it is not sustainable. we cannot see this kind of trend continue.
what is to be done? europe is you here in pulling away. there's only so much pulling in sharing can do. it is the kind of thing we would like to see. the dutch could only afford half 7, but the swedes can buy the other half. together they have a plane. that is how shearing works. we have a fleet that is funded and can effectively provide early warning and control. we could buy five major drugs and see what is happening on the ground. -- drones and see what is happening on the ground.
there are two fundamental obstacles to turn these anecdotal steps into real capabilities down the line. our national defense industries are frankly too small for the national markets. there is a need for fundamental reform, are frankly there is no willingness to do that. there's no incentive for governments to give up control over their national defense. that makes cooperation difficult. there is the issue of sovereignty. when it comes to defense, sovereignty is the issue that ultimately comes home. for the gains to give up their submarine fleet by saying that they should rely on the u.k. or the dutch. they may be ok for the dutch to get out of the army business. but it is not ok for france or
the u.k. or germany to likewise truly poll and share. share. and the real problem is to have pulling and sharing based on key strong allies. those allies may not be willing to dashed on key strong allies is that those allies may not be willing to share their capabilities. industry innational the way we have sovereignty -- i see a bleak future unless something changes, and a future that frankly hurts the united states. interest in america's europe.a weak it is fundamentally in our interest to have the strongest europe we can.
we need to find a way ultimately for this alliance to prosper by having more resources devoted to defense. as economies rebound, there is a need to increase spending on defense. as economies rebound, more of that spending needs to go into investment. denise to be, to the extent we could find a way, him more cooperation, including on the issue of role specialization. that may also mean a reordering of our priorities. heresy, although anyone who knows me knows it is a heresy i have long believed in. our spending on nuclear weapons is probably not the smartest spending we can think about when it comes to the future of this alliance. weapons are not likely to have any role in anything we do in 99.99% of the time. perhaps even 100 sent.
awayhey take resources from capabilities and forces 99 if not 100% of the time. cost is necessary here and may well be necessary in europe as well. thank you for listening. happy to take your questions. [applause] you, very much or that think that is i quite an important address. you hear from the ambassador. the real question is, will nato be there when we need it. only ont remains focus collective defense, it is irrelevant for the future. out the stark numbers about defense capabilities and investments. and laid out the important obstacles i think we faced overcome it with defense
increased sovereignty. there is a lot to get into. i know there is a lot of interest in the audience. let me start where you ended. on the nuclear point. our next conversation with john cut -- part right-hand others will get into nuclear missile defense issues for the alliance. correct me if i'm wrong, but you said, when you're saying if collective defense is the focus, that actually the path to irrelevance might be as important commitments for the alliance for the future. while you served as an after at nato, you went through the defense posture review. our danish colleagues already noted you thought that was not really a challenge to a linear policy. you have the commitments that really put constraints on what the alliance perhaps might do on its own nuclear weapons and the absence of moves on russia's part.
here,s the way forward given that was a strong message you just ended on? argue i spent a lot of time on this. first, anybody who knows me, i have been arguing about this since 1988, including the need to get rid of nuclear weapons in europe here it is not a surprise. nor was it to anybody in the administration, even though not everybody agreed with it. we worked very hard in deterrence and defense posture. we work very hard in the commitments to make clear it is possible under the right circumstances not only to reduce our alliance but in fact eliminate a reliance on u.s. nuclear weapons in europe. there is nothing in these documents that prohibits the possibility of getting there. we talked about russian reciprocity. russian agreements.
we do talk about the need to work together within the alliance. it does not talk about the fact that russia could have a veto over what we do. i would argue over the last four years, we have substantially addressed the key deterrence issues of our time. we have found ways to bolster deterrence. across the board. this will be an issue discussed in the next panel. the deployment of missile defenses is not just a promise. it is a reality that exists today. it is part of a commitment this administration has made to nato to take a u.s. deployment of u.s. missile defenses to defend the u.s. from europe into deployment of a nato missile defense in nato to defend nato. that was the fundamental shift that occurred in september 2009.
to take a system that was able to deploy against possibly 10 incoming missiles, and put in place a nato system under nato command and control for the defense of nato countries. that is the kind of commitment to deterrence that we put in place. plant in place contingency to make sure every nation that is a member of nato has a plan to being defended. that was an important contribution to deterrence. we just come pleaded this month, this week, last week, the first major article five live exercise, the alliance conducted in the last 10 years. many of the countries that participated in that exercise have never participated in an article five exercise. we just completed that. those are the kinds of steps that really matter for collective defense.
far more than how many nuclear weapons you may have in what country. when the cost of modernizing those nuclear weapons runs into 10 plus elion dollars, when the cost to modernize your aircraft to carry those weapons runs into the many hundreds of millions of dollars. it is those kinds of strengths and deterrence that ought to be the focus of our effort and using arms does -- arms control, and cooperative security as a means to enhance nato's insurance and defense posture. >> when you are serving out of brussels, the president's announce all that's announcement ,- the president's announcement for what it meant for them, you just said today something very important. that it may have been the reality of defense spending outpacing europe for the first time last year. you cited the efforts of gates and his concerns and speeches
about potential demilitarization in europe. secretary panetta as well. and yet, it does not seem to have the impact were helped turn the tide on some of these issues, given the reality of the wherecs in the countries members of the lines and economic situation, what is the path lowered here -- the path forward here? >> i think that is the message i am here to repeat. i do not think this is a time for agonizing reappraisals. a time inhere was not 1954 for agonizing reappraisals. this is not one either. the message is we need europe. our most important strategic partner. they are the countries that when the matter is at
hand, will be on our side. a europe that is not capable to be there is not very useful to us. says, frankly,t if you cannot be on our side because you lack the capability, that is bad for us but certainly not good for you. that is the message i heard secretary panetta and clinton deliver over and over again. reality is, it means we will have to make choices. when it comes to when and how to intervene and what place and for what purposes, we will make choices. libya was a choice. we could have taken on the entire libya campaign by ourselves. most ated the interests stake were not hours. they were countries in the mediterranean. i heard stefanie earlier talking about the importance of the threats from the south and the understanding that these are threats to the entire alliance
and libya was a response to that. it should not be surprising. it should be welcomed that countries in the mediterranean that were nato members took on the responsibility for taking on libya. that is how it should be. it is right that the bases we flew our planes from were in italy and greece rather than poland, not only because it longer to get from poland to libya than it does from italy, but because our interests are at stake. it means there may be other conflicts that come down where our interests are not as much directly involved as they are from other countries, but then the question comes, are those countries as they were in libya able to do what is necessary or will they have lost the capability to do so? see what is we will important and what matters. those are the kinds of decisions that, frankly, i do not see
countries in europe debating. i hope i am wrong. i hope the european council meeting in december will be the first one of many -- in many years, to talk about defense, will take a very serious look about what it means to be serious about defense. frankly, right now, it does not look like europe is sufficiently serious about the defense it needs to have, not only to serve its own interests, but frankly, those of the alliance as a whole. >> you put a lot of interest -- issues on the table. i will call on you. wait for a mic and please introduce yourself and ask a quick question. handle on the agenda as well. ilet me start in the front here. if we have a mic here and come back here. >> the atlantic counsel. thank you for your comments. will nato be around when we need or need ?its as you know one of
the things nato has not done well is provide a strong message to the domestic public as to why it's important. perhaps we won't have the same christmas that he may have when he said the reason was to keep the russians out and the germans down. why do you think nato had a tough time coming up with a good e message for the domestic public? what would you put as the core of the message realizing i think definitely spending almost every circumstanced will go down substantially not up? >>ic it's a fair and important good question. i think we have gone through a period, frankly, since the end of the cold war. where we believe that we're in sort of a new nirvana. a place in which conflict doesn't occur. if it occurs it's economic. not military.
it's not enough to be economically strong. over the last five years doesn't look that good. to have civic power. that's important. but you also need good old fashioned hard military power. how far it has penetrated at the elite level isn't clear to me. certainly hasn't penetrated enough in the parliament tear level. we need to do a better job explaining why it is important
that nations who like to be taken seriously in the world require military capabilities to be partners in the larger endeavors that confront us. let's be clear. it's not clear in this country it is definitely clare there's no support or knowledge for nato . much of the parliament -- the congressman and senators don't know much about nato. most would be surprised it continues to run the mission but between a third and half of the troops there being from european countries. we have done not a particularly good job of explaining the importance of nato to our own security to our own -- what it is that europe and nato contributes to what we do day in and day out. we, before we start lecturing
our european friends about how important it is they go out and tell their parliament how central nato is and defense spending is. we have a job to do here ourselves. >> the common message we're taking to heart here to think about how effectively to engage on capitol hill to capture the narrative. let me have two more questions. the woman here and the gentleman in the back. >> thank you. i'm from the -- [inaudible] i wish had been said by the program or defense -- posture review what is going on.
there was little said to push the europeans in the direction you outlined. i can say this. i'm a european. i think without the americans taking the lead lecturing the europeans on issue like this. there's not going to be a movement on the nuclear front. there are so many holy cows buried in the nuclear issue that will prevent the alliance from taking that, i think, is necessary. and using euphemisms -- [inaudible]
those listens start talking clearly to what is would be good for the to be able to move forward. thank you. >> everything you have said is true times 10%. very important -- perhaps none has been more important to the success of the alliance than the u.s.-german relationship. which today seems to be undergoing a few stresses and challenges.
i wonder if you would comment on how we get this relationship back on track. how badly off track you think it is. and what the implications might for the future of the alliance. >> thank you. on the nuclear issue, i would say that it's much easier to have an individual than a collective opinion. more importantly when you are daling in an alliance you need the agreement of 28 countries. and let me assure you that nothing i said today will become of news to any of colleagues in brussels or in the u.s. government. there were many times when the kinds of arguments you heard today were right -- being mentioned and pushed inside. but ultimately a nato document and a document that gets signed off by 28 countries. and if one country says no, it
doesn't get done. i learned a lot about consensus building in my four years. it means sometimes you don't get all that you want. i would argue with the deterrence and defense review, we got a lot. and i think it's important document that needs to be read not only for what is in it, but much more importantly for what is not in it. if you compare this to any other statement on the nuclear weapons in the past, you'll see what i mean. scott, on -- >> if you want to comment on the point particular, fred? first, i hope you agree with me 110% when you say times 10 percent. [laughter] that means you disagree with 90% of i had to say. soily take this as -- full agreement with what i said, which i appreciate much of whey learned about industry i learned from you. when it comes to europe. that's good.
i think the understoodment tal relationship we within nato must be with germany and germany being a strong and critical player. that makes the last few weeks, last few months a very difficult time nor all the reasons that we know. germany's disagreic interest life as germt any has decided since 1949, really since it became a member in 1952 of nato to be at the center of nato. it has gone through difficult issues i.t. at least in the decisions with respect to libya. it is now going through some difficult issues with regard to the relationship between the united states. i think the